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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Christina Pontoppidan’s paper has two different parts, a destructive one and a 
constructive one. In the first part she aims to demonstrate that Stephen Toulmin’s 
model of argument, so heartily embraced (and employed) by many rhetoricians, is 
in fact still a much more logical than rhetorical model. In the second part she 
develops instead what she regards as a truly rhetorical model of the process of 
creating a persuasive argument. Although this model is much less a revision than a 
replacement of Toulmin’s model, both have more in common than it would seem. 
 
2.  TOULMIN AND THE TOPICS 
 
Pontoppidan is certainly right in observing that Toulmin’s structural model, in spite 
of the book’s title promising to investigate the uses of argument, still works rather as 
a tool for evaluating the soundness of given arguments than as practical instruction 
on how to build arguments, and has hence not really essentially detached itself from 
the classical background of formal logic. She rightly points to the basically logical 
vocabulary Toulmin uses. 
Toulmin himself, however, was convinced that he had rediscovered “the 
topics of Aristotle’s Topics”. It is probably no coincidence that in the same period 
also other scholars (such as most prominently Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-
Tyteca, 1958; see Warnick, 2000) began to turn the dialectical Aristotle of the Topics 
against the syllogistical Aristotle of the Analytics. Yet Pontoppidan insists that 
Toulmin actually missed the real rhetorical and inventive potential of Aristotle’s 
Topics. Based on work by Christopher Tindale (2007), she differentiates between 
the dialectical use of topics in the Topics (which was the one that mainly appealed to 
Toulmin) and their rhetorical employment in the context of the Rhetoric.  
However, it is not quite so easy to discern between a dialectical and a 
rhetorical concept of topics in Aristotle. In fact, Aristotle already sets his Topics a 
double task: It is meant to be useful both as an instruction on how to find and 
construct good and efficient arguments and as a means for testing other people’s 
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arguments for soundness (ch. 2, 101a25-b4). Moreover, it never gets entirely clear if 
Aristotle regarded a topos as a precast argument scheme or rather as a particular 
premise of some kind. The latter seems to be implied when we learn that what a 
debater needs to do in a dialectical exchange is first define the conclusion to be 
reached (as a rule the contradictory of the opponent’s claim) and then work logically 
backwards to find appropriate premises from which the intended result can be 
successfully deduced. But since these premises need to secure approval from the 
opponent, they must be éndoxa (opinions that have the approval of a majority of 
people or of the best experts or of a majority thereof). In other words, they must 
represent some common ground between the arguers.  
Notoriously, Aristotle never defines his notion of topos in the Topics. The 
closest he ever comes to a definition is in the Rhetoric, Book II chapter 26: “a topos is 
a heading under which many enthymemes fall.” (Rhet. 1403a18-19, trans. Kennedy, 
1991, p. 214). This, however, sounds more like the definition of an argument scheme 
than a place where to go to find arguments (even less so an advice where to place an 
argument, as Pontoppidan, p. 6, seems to insinuate). It is only Cicero who is more 
explicit on loci being “places from which arguments can be retrieved”, and not only 
in the passage from De oratore cited by Pontoppidan (p. 6, the precise reference is 
De or. II, 41, 174), but also in his own Topica (sedes, e quibus argumenta promuntur, 
Topica 7; cf. Leff, 1983), where he attributes this view also to Aristotle; whether 
rightly so, we cannot tell. 
Hence, Pontoppidan may be right in accusing Toulmin of having missed the 
creative or heuristic potential of the topics as a method to find and build persuasive 
arguments. But this he could probably only have found in Cicero (or, for that matter, 
Quintilian), yet not really in Aristotle, not even in the Rhetoric. For the list of topical 
enthymemes that Aristotle presents in Rhetoric II 23 is again an inventory of formal 
argument schemes (or inference warrants in Toulminian parlance; see Braet, 2005). 
And it may be misleading to cite Aristotle’s famous definition of rhetoric as the art of 
“discovering the available means of persuasion” (1355b); this may easily be a (very 
popular) mistranslation, since the Greek verb in question is theōrēsai, which might 
better be translated as “contemplating theoretically” than “discovering”. It may refer 
to the stipulated epistemological rank of rhetoric as a theorizable art rather than to 
an inventive process. 
Toulmin may therefore after all not have misrepresented his topical Aristotle 
all that much. 
 
3. THE ‘RHETORICAL’ MODEL 
 
All this, of course, does not in the least tell against the merits of Pontoppidan’s own 
alternative model of rhetorical invention expounded in the second part. Differently 
from Toulmin’s, it works exclusively with clearly rhetorical concepts such as 
‘standpoint’, ‘common ground’ and ‘proof’. It defines persuasion as the ultimate aim 
of rhetorical argument, and audience orientation as its essential feature (for which 
Tindale’s most relevant book of 2015 could have been cited along with his 2007 
paper). In that context it may be noted that the omission of a premise is by no means 
“a defining feature” of Aristotle’s concept of the enthymeme (p. 7); it is just a 
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possibility recommended in the interest of not boring one’s audience. Moreover, 
Wenzel’s observation (1987) that a rhetorical perspective would regard arguing as a 
persuasive process (as opposed to a product or procedure) is interpreted as also 
applying to the process of building an argument, which may be an extension of what 
Wenzel originally had in mind. 
Pontoppidan’s model starts from a persuader’s “standpoint”, i.e. the view the 
persuader firmly commits himself to. This is quite like what Kenneth Burke may 
have meant by “truth” (1931, p. 212), or what Joachim Knape, in deliberate 
orthographical distortion of a Latin term, has called the orator’s “zertum” (2000, p. 
76). Without a standpoint, no “rhetorical situation” (Bitzer, 1968) or “rhetorical 
case” (Knape, 2000, p. 76) will come about in the first place. It may be disputable, 
though, if ancient stasis theory is the best guidance for finding one’s standpoint, 
since it was essentially devised for courtroom speeches and is not always easily 
applicable to other kinds of oratory. Yet standpoints may be of various kinds, 
depending on (as Toulmin might have said) “fields of argument”. 
Next, from audience orientation it follows that the persuader must search for 
common ground shared between audience and persuader in order to be persuasive. 
Modern cognitive theory has spoken of the requirement that speaker and audience 
must share “cognitive environments” in order to enable persuasive communication 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1986). This is a modern adaptation of Aristotle’s concept on 
éndoxa in the Topics. Basing their arguments on éndoxa is a point the dialectician 
and the rhetorician have in common over against the scientist.  
Pontoppidan’s graphic model obviously allows for a plurality of common 
grounds, depending on a plurality of different audiences. That means that a good 
persuader will adapt his or her argument to the best common ground available in 
any given situation in the face of any given audience. This is perhaps the moment 
where topoi may help most. Yet the lists of topoi Pontoppidan mentions in that 
context are heterogeneous. On the one hand (p. 9), she cites Aristotle’s télē or “ends” 
specific to each genre of speech and the ultimate “ends” of all argumentation that we 
find in the Rhetoric to Alexander (which is not really addressed to Alexander the 
Great, but is just called so because in manuscripts it is preceded by a fake dedicatory 
letter to Alexander) in ch. 1.4, 1421b. But the topoi she mentions on p. 10 (economy, 
environment, ethics, health culture, legislation, aesthetics, religion) are of a very 
different kind: they refer to different subject matters, quite in the sense of Toulmin’s 
“fields”. Actually, the Rhetoric to Alexander offers a quite similar list of subject 
matters (ch. 2.2, 1423a). 
From established common ground the persuader will finally search for 
proofs, which, together with common ground, will justify the standpoint. Here again, 
the persuader will look for topical tools. But these will now be related to forms or 
types of proofs (examples, analogies, enthymemes, inductions, expert opinions, 
research results etc.) rather than to contents. Does this not bring us back to 
argument schemes again? Of course, Pontoppidan insists that from a rhetorical point 
of view it is not the logical form of the argument that is important, but its heuristic 
function. Yet in the end, one can’t help feeling that on each of these three steps of the 
rhetorical model, topics means something slightly different. 
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Appealing as Pontoppidan’s model may be to rhetoricians, one may still play 
devil’s advocate and ask if the same heuristic process might not be described by 
Toulmin’s model as well. For, in Toulmin’s vocabulary, any arguer (or persuader) 
will first need to determine his or her claim (standpoint). Next, he or she will try to 
find a convenient warrant that can reasonably be expected to be shared by the 
individual persuadee (common ground). And finally, he or she will search for data 
(proofs) that, together with the warrant, will justify the claim.  
To use one of Toulmin’s standard examples, if it is my firm standpoint that 
Harry is a British subject, and it is my aim to persuade some other person of this 
conviction, what I will first look for is some general rule that I can reasonably 
assume to be shared by my audience or opponent, for instance that people born in 
Bermuda are British subjects (which can be backed by the argument that Bermuda 
is a British Overseas Territory and people born in such Territories are British 
subjects). If this is granted, all I need to do is produce evidence (data) for the fact 
that Harry was born in Bermuda, such as his birth certificate or his own allegation 
or even a friend’s testimony. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, Pontoppidan’s observation that Toulmin’s alleged rediscovery of the topic of 
the Topics still retains a distinctive dialectical and logical ring that both dismissive 
logicians and enthusiastic rhetoricians have failed to notice is perfectly correct. The 
heuristic topical model of argument invention and construction that she proposes 
instead, is in itself a very appropriate and useful tool for describing the process of 
building an argument from topical grounds in a rhetorical context. It uses rhetorical 
vocabulary where Toulmin uses logical terms. Yet the process of argument building 
and the process of persuasion are still two different processes. And the Toulmin 
model can perhaps be adapted to both. It just depends how one reads it. If one reads 
it top down (or left to right), it becomes a logical model for argument evaluation. But 
if one reads it bottom up (or right to left), it may equally well describe the heuristic 
process of argument creation. Aristotle, in his Topics, too, goes both ways. 
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